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Abstract
This paper analyses the economics of EU enlargement from three perspectives. First, we
provide an institutional background and point out the importance of Agenda 2000. Second,
we then analyse the implications for EU trade with Central and Easter European Countries
(CEEC’s) and in particular we discuss the EU Antidumping legislation and its implications
for trade integration between the EU and CEEC’s. Third, we engage in an analysis of the
implications of economic integration for the EU labour market. To this end, we use a unique
firm level survey of 281 Belgian firms. Our findings suggest that: (i) the EU follows a too
restrictive approach to trade integration; (ii) economic integration with CEEC’s leads to a
reduction in the demand for low-skilled labour in small firms, however, this effect is reversed
for large firms.
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I. Introduction
In almost all post communist countries widespread economic reforms have taken place and an
increasingly growing private sector has been established. Most of the transition countries are
now starting to emerge from their deep recessions and show in fact high and positive growth
rates of which many Western nations can only dream. Table 1 shows a number of key
economic indicators for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). From column
(1) it can be seen that most countries have growth rates of more than 4% in 1996, while
unemployment rates (column 2) vary a lot among different countries. Compared to the EU
average of 1.6%, the growth rate in most CEEC’s is much higher, so that some catching-up
can be expected; the unemployment rate and the share of industry in GDP are comparable to
the EU average; while the share of agriculture in GDP is much higher in CEECs.











EU (15) 1.6 10.9 22.3 1.5
Bulgaria -10.9 12.5 31.6 11.4
Croatia 4.3 16.4 20.3 (1) 9.2
Czech
Republic
3.9 3.5 33.8 5.1
Estonia 4.0 5.6 18.9 6.4
Macedonia 1.1 24.9 n.a. n.a.
Hungary 1.3 10.5 n.a. n.a.
Latvia 2.8 7.2 27.8 9.1
Lithuania 5.1 7.1 28.3 11.4
Moldova -8.0 1.8 25.0 n.a.
Poland 6.1 13.2 27.1 6.0
Romania 4.1 6.1 36.0 19.1
Slovakia 6.9 11.1 28.9 5.7
Slovenia 3.1 13.9 27.8 3.7
(1)   At 1990 constant prices
Source: Transition report update (April 1998), European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development4
At the same time fear has grown in the industrialised countries that the globalisation of the
economy and the increased competition from CEECs will harm domestic industry and
welfare. Wood (1995) argues that the deteriorating situation of unskilled workers in
developed countries is caused mainly by an expansion of trade with developing countries,
while Krugman and Lawrence (1994) argue that the effects of trade have been relatively
small. From a theoretical point of view a deeper integration of CEECs with the EU can occur
through different channels (see also Abraham and Konings, 1997). Either CEEC workers in
search of better paid jobs move to the EU or through the mobility of capital, integration can
result in a rise of foreign direct investment (FDI). The other way is through an increase in
trade between the EU and the CEECs.
In this paper we will deal with some aspects of the relations between the EU and the CEECs
and their implications for economic integration. Our main argument in this paper is that the
Europe Agreements are too conservative. This conservatism is the result of EU fear of losing
jobs, capital and wealth. We show that in many respects this fear is ungrounded. Short run
costly adjustments may occur, but long run gains from integration are eminent. In section II
we provide an historical background in the form of a chronological outline of events that led
to the Luxembourg Council which selected Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and
the Czech Republic for EU membership. In section III we will analyse the Europe
Agreements and study their impact on trade flows. Section IV analyses the potential effect of
CEEC integration on the EU labour market. Section V is a concluding one.
II. Institutional background
From Phare to Agenda 2000
The 1989 revolutionary changes in East and Central Europe took the European Community
(EC) by surprise. Though it had fought communism relentlessly during the Cold War, its
reaction was rather irresolute, to say the least. Emergency aid was granted to the Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) under the PHARE-programme. In 1991 and 1992 the
Europe Agreements were signed. The aim was to set up an industrial free trade area, with a5
ten year transitional period starting from the entry into force of the Agreement. With the
Europe Agreements the CEECs were no longer discriminated against by the EC (Nötzold,
1994). But they did not enjoy any major privileges either. About 80 % of EC imports from
third countries entered duty-free anyway. The CEECs were less well off than the
Mediterranean and the Associated Countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific that got
more significant trade concessions from the EC. Therefore, one after another, the CEECs and
the Baltic states applied for EC membership. The Copenhagen European Council (21-22 June
1993) agreed that the Associated Countries could join the EC provided they assumed the
obligations of membership. But the conditions put forward in the European Council’s final
communiqué went much further than the ones mentioned in art. 237 of the Rome treaty (DN:
DOC/93/3; 1993-06-22). As Inotai (1996) points out, the Copenhagen decision in fact
constituted an act of discrimination against the CEECs. For the first time, specific conditions
were being imposed on acceding countries, whereas art. 237 laid down only one condition,
namely, that an entrant country must be European.
Apart from the political conditions, membership of the CEECs required a functioning market
economy, the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EC,
and even adherence to the aims of the EMU. One and a half year later, the Essen European
Council (9-10 December 1994) made a more concrete condition: the CEECs were expected to
adopt the so-called Internal Market acquis communautaire (DN: DOC/94/4; 1994-12-10).
Adoption of EC Internal Market Law was to benefit the reform of the CEEC economies and
the strengthening of their competitive powers. At the Cannes European Council (26-27 June
1995) the Commission submitted a White Paper containing a detailed sector by sector
presentation of relevant EC legislation in the Internal Market area (DN: DOC/95/6; 1995-06-
27). It was intended to guide CEEC efforts towards integration into the Community. On 15
July 1997 - one month after the completion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - the
Commission put forward its Agenda 2000. This document dealt with both the enlargement
and the necessary restructuring of the EU (COM (97) 2000 def.).6
Agenda 2000
In  Agenda 2000 the Commission identifies three main bottlenecks for enlargement
negotiations have to cope with: relocation of firms, migration of workers and the financial
burden for the EC will have to bear. To start with the first bottleneck: the Commission
apparently fears that EC firms with  low costs of liquidation and relatively high labour and
transport costs might want to relocate eastward in an enlarged Union, because of the low unit
labour costs and the proximity to the main EU markets. This could result in substantial
sectoral and regional adjustment pressure in the current Member States. It might be most
marked in agriculture, coal and mining and traditional industries such as textiles. But at the
same time the Commission vaguely admits that upstream sectors such as food processing and
clothing could benefit from adjustment pressure. We will argue that empirical evidence
refutes delocalization of EC companies (see section III).
With respect to labour the Commission does not expect mass emigration of CEEC workers to
current Member States. Past enlargement experience learns that migration flows are affected
by economic conditions and prospects, more than by the right of free movement. On the other
hand, because of the rather substantial wage differential with the West and today’s political
and economic upheaval in the CEECs, migration pressures from Eastern Europe may be
different from earlier enlargements. But as Faini (1995) points out, the anticipation of future
economic growth in the CEECs themselves might act as a barrier to migration. The more so
when migration costs are taken into account. Anyhow, labour market imbalances might
increase, if lowly and highly skilled CEEC workers look for employment opportunities in the
EC (especially Germany). The Commission is right when stating that more intense
competition in the labour market, be it directly through migration or indirectly through FDI,
will make necessary wage moderation in the current Member States. For the time being
Member States are allowed to sign agreements with CEECs requiring strict controls on
emigration. For the part of the CEECs, they will have to adopt EU social standards (e.g. with
respect to safety and health at work) and this might hurt their competitive positions.7
The CEECs are more populous, poorer, and more agricultural than the poorest four Member
States put together (Baldwin, 1995). This will translate itself into an increase in the EC
budget. First of all CEECs will become eligible for assistance under the Structural Funds and
the Cohesion Fund. The Commission points out that many regions, both in current Member
States and CEECs, will be exposed to strong competition and will remain very dependent on
agriculture and sensitive industrial sectors. This implies that enlargement will lead to a sharp
increase in the population eligible for assistance. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain receive
significant amounts of money out of the Funds because they have regions with a GDP per
capita of less than 75 percent of the EC average. Some of these regions will loose aid in favor
of CEECs, which have at the moment a per capita GDP of only about 40 to 50 percent of the
EC average (Franke, 1997).
The extension of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in its current form to the new
Member States will create an additional financial burden (Nuti, 1996; Marks and Techen,
1997). CEEC prices are substantially lower than CAP ones, especially in heavily protected
sectors (dairy products, sugar and certain vegetables and fruits). Introduction of CAP prices
will stimulate CEEC production, thus add to projected surpluses. It will dampen domestic
demand and raise raw material prices for the food industry. WTO constraints will prevent the
EC from dumping its surpluses on third country markets. In order to prevent this, the
Commission favors the further restructuring of European farming, both in current and new
Member States. But it remains very vague about the way this is going to happen (Bos and
Merrienboer, 1996; Fischler, 1997). Either way the CEECs will remain long-term net
recipients of substantial EC transfer payments. Estimations vary widely but according to
some recent literature they fluctuate between ECU 15 billion and ECU 18 billion a year
(Inotai, 1996; Franke, 1997; Baldwin, FranHois and Portes, 1997). While the estimated cost
seems small in relation to the total GDP of the EC, it represents nevertheless a significant
amount of the EC budget. Half a year after the publication of Agenda 2000 the Luxembourg
European Council, while adopting the Commission’ s report (12-13 December 1997),8
officially launched the enlargement process. The Community declared itself ready to start
enlargement negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia (DN: DOC/97/24; 1997-12-13). This implies the liberalisation of trade, capital and
labour. In the next section we will deal with trade issues.
III. Free movement of goods
Trading partners
International trade between the EU and the CEECs shows a huge potential for growth. Table
2 shows that in 1990 the EU traded only with a subset of CEECs. Moreover, the trade balance
with these countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) was negative suggesting that the
EU at that point was a net importer. Despite the trade deficit with CEECs, imports in 1990
accounted for no more than 2% of total EU world imports. Six years later in 1996, well
beyond the early stages of transition the direction of trade flows has been reversed to the
benefit of the EU. Although EU imports from existing trade partners in the East continue to
rise and new partners enter the trade arena (Estonia and Slovenia), it is especially EU exports
towards Eastern Europe which experience the most dramatic increase. Over the period 1990-
1996 the trade deficit (column 3) of the EU with Eastern Europe has become a trade surplus
which continues to rise. Or, in other words the EU has become a net exporter to the East.
Table 2: Trade between EU and CEECs (In 1000 ECU)
IMPORTS EXPORTS TRADE BALANCE
Partner 1990 1996 1990 1996 1990 1996
Poland 5156541 12252019 4393069 19856885 -763472 7604866
Czech Republic 0 9754836 0 13975408 0 4220572
Czechoslovakia
* 2688731 0 2606242 -82489
Slovakia 0 3420191 0 3997883 0 577692
Hungary 2934049 8826614 2876155 10000620 -57894 1174006
Slovenia 0 4270346 0 5377062 0 1106716
Estonia 0 1088772 0 1696732 0 607960
Total 10779321 39612778 9875466 54904590 -903855 15291812
* In 1993 former Czechoslovakia was split in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic
(Slovakia).9
Table 3 shows that the CEECs have become very dependent on  imports from the EU.
Hungary is probably the most extreme example. Whereas in 1990 only 40% of total
Hungarian imports came from the EU, in 1996 Hungary gets 80% of its imports from the EU.
In contrast, when we consider total EU imports in 1996, the share of CEEC imports in total
does not exceed 7%. When we look at the export structure we note from table 3 that CEECs
have also become much more reliant on the EU in terms of their exports. In 1996 the majority
of CEEC exports was shipped to the EU. While for the EU, exports towards CEECs
compared to total exports was only 3% in 1990 and stayed just below 10% for 1996. Hence
from these figures it appears that the power balance in the trade relationship is clearly in favor
of the European Union.













Partner 1990 1996 1990 1996
Poland 67% 68% 48% 64%
Czech Republic 0% 64% 0% 57%
Czechoslovakia 25% 0% 29% 0%
Slovakia 0% 46% 0% 49%
Hungary 42% 80% 39% 89%
Slovenia 0% 73% 0% 86%
Estonia 0% 67% 0% 67%
Source: Eurostat External Trade
Antidumping duties
Trade with CEECs will not grow unless it is encouraged by a commitment to open markets by
the EU. For the time being this is not so. The Europe Agreements aim to abolish all tariffs
and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on EU-CEEC trade, but they maintain restricting clauses and,
in critical sectors, offer only a gradual approach to free trade. (See e.g. text of the Agreement
establishing an Association between the EC and its Member States with Hungary: Official
Journal L347, 1993/12/31). For the time being, EC tariffs on sensitive products (some items
of chemicals, steel products, furniture, leather goods, footwear, glass and vehicles) remain in
existence. As Leipold (1995) points out: sensitive products make up roughly half of total EC
imports from CEECs, so the later ones may have great difficulties further increasing their
exports to the EC, if nothing changes. Broadly speaking, CEEC comparative advantages can10
be seen to correlate with the sensitive products where exceptions were made to the trade
liberalization programme. (Leipold, 1995; van Brabant, 1996; Steinherr, 1995; Centre for
Economic Policy Research, 1992). Agriculture is mainly left out of the Europe Agreements
and trade concessions in this field are more symbolic than real. The Europe Agreements
contain safeguard clauses in cases of serious injury to domestic producers of competitive
products, serious disturbances in any sector of the economy or in the economic situation of a
region, serious balance of payments difficulties.
There are further restrictions. The abolishment of customs duties and quotas only applies to
products originating in the Partner Country. This means that the products have to be wholly
manufactured in this country or they must have undergone sufficient working or processing.
A processed product is not considered as originating in a Partner Country if its value does not
represent the highest percentage of the value of the product obtained The simple assembly of
parts imported from third countries to constitute a complete product is not covered by the
Agreement. This precludes CEECs from many relatively light processing tasks applied to
non-EU materials (CEPC, 1992). Evidence of origin has to be proven by certificates. The
only exception to this rule is that the Europe Agreements signed by the Viségrad countries
allow diagonal cumulation among Partner Countries. This means that these countries are
considered as one trading partner as far as the local content rule of products is concerned. A
local content requirement of about 60% can only serve to discourage the much needed direct
foreign (non-EU) investment in CEECs (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1992).
Another point which should be made is that the Agreements, as opposed to the one concluded
with the EFTA countries (European Economic Area agreement), do not exclude the
possibility of anti-dumping measures being taken by both parties (see e.g. art. 29 of the
Agreement with Hungary). The EC made only minor concessions in this field. In anti-
dumping investigations the CEECs are considered to be market economies. This means that
the calculation of the normal value will be based on the actual prices in the CEEC concerned
for the allegedly dumped products, thus not on the normal value for the goods in question in
an analogue country. The Agreements also stipulate that the Association Council must be11
supplied with all relevant information in view of seeking a solution acceptable to the two
parties. However this requirement seems to have had little impact on the practice of
Community institutions (Lenaerts, 1997). At the Essen European Council (1994) the
Commission committed itself to giving preference to price undertakings rather than duties in
order to conclude antidumping cases where material injury was found (DN: DOC/94/4; 1994-
12-10). This means that CEEC companies are requested to export at a minimum price and
that in this case no duties will be imposed against them.
EU industries can apply for antidumping measures whenever they see fit. Because
antidumping proceedings are very costly for the firms involved the mere existence of an
antidumping procedure gives an incentive for exporters to revise their export prices upwards
which reduces the probability of being involved in a dumping suit (see Staiger and Wolak,
1995; Pauwels, Vandenbussche and Weverbergh 1997). This implies that the number of
antidumping suits actually observed is likely to underestimate the effects antidumping
proceedings have on the trade flows. Even in the absence of antidumping petitions for
protection being filed, the trade flows are bound to be smaller than in the case where
antidumping laws would be abolished between the two trade partners. Table 4 gives an
overview of the antidumping cases which were submitted to the European Commission
against CEECs which are currently being considered for EU membership in the period 1990-
1996.
It becomes clear that mainly EU sensitive sectors are filing for antidumping protection. More
in particular the chemical sector (253) and the steel sector (222) are often triggering dumping
investigations on imports coming from CEECs. These sectors are important employers in the
EU (1.7 million jobs in the chemical sector) and are facing large overcapacity. Both the threat
of antidumping action and the actual resort to measures are preventing prices in the EU
market sliding down to levels, which are no longer viable for EU producers. The important
question here is whether antidumping measures are really necessary to curb unfair pricing
behavior by CEEC exporters or whether they are being used to compensate EU producers for
the comparative disadvantage they have in these sectors. In case of the latter, antidumping12
measures are being used as a tool of industrial policy to overcome the lack of European
competitiveness in these sectors. Recent empirical work seems to suggest that antidumping
protection whatever the objective it is serving, leads to rent-seeking. This means that
interested parties are trying to influence the outcome of antidumping procedures to their
benefit. For example a study by Konings, Vandenbussche and Veugelers (1997) has indicated
that the probability and level of antidumping protection are positively influenced by the
strength of union bargaining power in a sector. A study by Vandenbussche (1996) has
indicated that there are reasons to believe that European antidumping protection against
Poland, Hungary and former Czechoslovakia in the period 1985-1990 was on average
overestimated by 20 %. EU enlargement with these countries would eliminate antidumping
proceedings which in any case is bound to have a further positive effect on trade flows. This
also held true of Portugal and Spain the exports of which prior to their EU accession were
heavily suffering from EU antidumping measures.
Table 4: Antidumping cases of the EU against CEECs
Initiation Product Sector (NACE) Defendants
1990 Artificial Corund 253 Czechoslovakia
1991 ferro-silicon 224 Poland
1991 silicon carbide 253 Poland
1991 seamless steel tubes 222 Hungary, Poland
1993 Urea nitrate solution 253 Poland
1994 Portland cement 242 Poland, Czech and Slovak Republic
1994 Hermatite Iron 221 Czech Republic, Hungary
1995 zinc Poland
1995 Pallets of wood Poland
1995 profiles of non-alloy steel 222 Czech Republic, Hungary
1996 seamless pipes & tubes 222 Czech and Slovak Republic
1997 zinc Poland
1997 ferro-silicon 224 Poland
1997 hardboard Estonia, Poland
Source: Official Journal of the EC, 1990-97
Harmonisation of technical specifications and standards
Standards and specifications offer another loophole in the liberalisation process with CEECs.
They act like not-tariff barriers (NTBs), protecting domestic markets and driving a wedge
between domestic and  border prices (Baldwin, François and Portes, 1997). In the Europe
Agreements the CEECs commit themselves to ensuring that their future legislation will be13
compatible with EC specifications and standards as far as possible. But the Copenhagen
European Council (1993) wanted the CEECs “to harmonise their laws in order to prevent
distortion of competition and to offer protection to their workers, their consumers and their
environment” before their accession to the EU. Apparently the EU feared for distortion of
competition when CEEC companies were put on a lower level as to the protection of national
health, national security, consumers, labour and environment. At the same time it wanted to
prevent EU firms from relocating their plants to Member States with the lowest level of
protection (levelling the playing field).
Without doubt, past experiences influenced EU behaviour. In the past, the free circulation of
goods, services, labour and capital among the current Member States has often been
hampered by the lack of harmonised technical regulations and standards. Eventually it took
about thirty years to reach agreement on some one hundred thousand national regulations and
standards and even today, in some areas the Internal Market is far from being completed. The
two instruments to ensure free circulation within Community territory are either the mutual
recognition of legally marketed goods and services, or the technical harmonisation of
legislation. According to the European Court of Justice any product legally manufactured and
sold in one Member State should in principle enjoy free access to the other Member States
markets (Cassis de Dijon, 1979). Unfortunately some Member States (amongst them
Germany) objected to this approach and invoked grounds for special protection of public
morality, public security, health, industrial property, interests of workers or the environment.
This left the Commission with no other option than to elaborate the  legislation on technical
harmonisation. This may explain why the EU wanted the preparation of the CEECs for the
Internal Market to be at the heart of a Pre-Accession Strategy. It feared that lack of
harmonisation of standards and specifications could undo 20 years of hard work. In case the
CEECs acceded to the EC without their legislation being harmonised, current Member States
might retaliate. In other words: adjustment strains in both the current and the new Member
States would again segment the Internal Market, particularly in sectors where liberalization
under the Europe Agreements had been rather limited. The CEECs clearly faced a trade off. If
they did not adopt Community legislation, their products would be kept out of Member States14
markets. If they accepted Community specifications and standards, they might lose their
comparative cost advantage vis-à-vis their major competitors in other markets. By applying
for membership, the CEECs made it clear they were ready for harmonisation. But by
requiring CEECs to adopt the same legal restrictions on economic activity as it has itself, the
EU undermines many of the advantages of mutual trade (CEPR, 1992). Harmonisation should
not precede free trade but it should follow it. Tariff removal will leave CEEC imports from
the EU more vulnerable than EU imports from CEECs. CEEC standards and specifications
are not sophisticated enough to keep EU products out of their markets, while CEEC exports
to the EU are regulated by EU technical specifications and standards. When EU standards and
specifications are harmonised, a high minimum level is always chosen. Less developed
CEECs will find it difficult to meet these standards and specifications. CEEC vulnerability is
compounded by the fact that by the year 2001, free trade is supposed to cover 96 percent of
EU exports to the CEECs, but only about 70-80 percent of CEEC exports to the EU, since
agricultural products are excluded (Inotai, 1996; Mayhew, 1998).
Alternative: free competition
It is generally believed that competition law could constitute a better alternative to cope with
unfair trade practices (Lloyd, 1998). In the case of EU member states both competition and
antidumping policy were used to regulate trade among the then Member States, but only
during the transitional period. From 1970 on antidumping regulations were dropped so that
companies could take advantage of the enlarged market provided they acted in a fair way.
Unfortunately, in practice firms often take resort to various practices in order to offset the
effects of losses in monopoly power as a result of the liberalisation of trade (e.g. common
selling syndicates, which reserve their home markets for national producers, reciprocal
exclusive dealing agreements,  aggregate rebate systems, etc.). For this reason the Treaty of
Rome contains a chapter on competition (articles 85-90). Thus article 85(1) prohibits
agreements “... which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market ...
“. Under the terms of art. 86, any actions by one or more companies which “take improper
advantage of a dominant position and which affect trade between Member States” is15
prohibited. Since that time EC competition policy has developed as a result of a significant
amount of case law promulgated by the Commission and the Court of Justice (Kemp, 1994;
Bayliss and El-Agraa, 1990). The Commission is given strong executive powers and the
Court can enforce its judgements upon the governments and firms without interference of
national authorities. The companies are always entitled to take the Commission to the Court.
The latter can uphold or strike down the Commission’s decision.
In the past the Court ruled that action could be taken against companies wholly outside the
EC and without affiliates, branches or subsidiaries in Member States, when they pursue a
commercial policy which has detrimental effects upon the EC. Such action might imply the
use of commercial power, e.g. the banning or limiting of imports into the EC from these
companies (Commercial Solvents Case, 1974; Continental Can Case, 1971). The EC
competition policy thus encompasses firms in third countries in a manner that is not found in
the national legislation of any Member State. This means that the Commission does not
necessarily have to use protection instruments in case of alleged third countries (e.g. CEEC)
unfair trade practices. The Europe Agreements explicitly refer to articles 85-90 of the Rome
treaty. The CEECs received a three-year moratorium in order to apply EC competition policy.
For the first five-year period the CEECs will be regarded as an area identical to those areas
described in article 92.3(a) of the Treaty of Rome, i.e. backward areas where some relaxation
of competition rules is allowed. The Association Council can prolong this period for a further
five years. But if in the mean time the EC thinks that a particular practice is incompatible
with its laws on competition, it can take the appropriate measures. This could mean taking
antidumping measures. Although it has been shown that these measures are biased in favour
of EC producers and their application is subject to discretionary powers (Lenaerts, 1997).
As said before CEECs are obliged to adopt within three years nearly the full arsenal of EU
competition law. The only exception is for state aid, which may be deemed acceptable on
some grounds. State aids could also act as a NTB. As a general rule state aids which favour
certain enterprises or products and which distort trade between Member States is, under the
terms of art. 92 incompatible with the Common Market. However there are certain16
exceptions. Aid may be deemed compatible if it is intended to aid the development of
underdeveloped regions, the promotion of certain important projects of European interest or
the development of certain activities or certain economic regions. It is for the Commission to
decide whether aid is acceptable but the Member States can appeal to Court. In 1973 the
Council reached an agreement on the principles for regional and sectoral aid. These principles
aimed both at regulating competition between Member States (that tried to woo foreign
investors to underdeveloped areas) and at assisting the Commission in its task of evaluation
(Bayliss and El-Agraa, 1990). On several occasions the CEECs - who dismantled state
controls in recent years - declared themselves ready to control state aids, to adopt the 1973
criteria put forward by the Council and to accept the Commission’s authority to sanction
unjustified aid. CEEC producers suffer a double-jeopardy: if competition and state aids law
does not get them, antidumping will (CEPR, 1992). We firmly believe that both competition
and state aids policies would be more first best ways of safeguarding EC interests. Moreover
these policies are more transparent for third countries, more predictable and provide more
legal certainty than Antidumping Regulations.
IV. Adjustment of the Labour Market
Contrary to what the CEECs had hoped for, the Europe Agreements do not accord free
movement to CEEC workers. They just stipulate that, taking into account the labour market
situation in each Member State, the existing facilities for access to employment accorded
under bilateral agreements are to be improved, if possible. Moreover the treatment given to
CEEC workers has to be free from discrimination. On the other hand, the Europe Agreements
do provide a stimulus for FDI. Companies are granted freedom of establishment provided
they comply with the respective national legislation. During the ten year transitional period
the CEECs are allowed to introduce measures which derogate from the freedom of
establishment if certain national industries are undergoing restructuring or are facing serious
difficulties, particularly when this entails serious social problems or when they face the
drastic reduction of their market shares or when they are newly emerging industries. These
measures shall cease to apply upon the expiration of the transitional period and shall be17
reasonable and necessary in order to remedy the situation. While applying such measures, the
CEECs shall grant whenever possible a preferential treatment to EC companies. Freedom of
establishment is also limited by the restriction on the EU side placed on the free movement of
labour. A CEEC firm can be established in the EU but must employ, with only a few
exceptions (key personnel like managers, supervisors, highly qualified workers and
professionals) staff recruited within the EC.
Competitive pressure
The restrictive clauses in the Europe Agreements show that the opening of Central and
Eastern Europe has led to concern about the job generating potential of the economies in the
EU. With an unemployment rate of 10% in the EU, the EU fears trade with the CEECs as
well as free mobility of CEEC capital and labour. CEEC residents might move westwards or
EU firms might decide to open up production facilities in CEECs so as to benefit from low
wage costs and to avoid the bargaining strength of strong EU labour unions (e.g. Wes, 1997).
In this section we will first analyse the potential effects of the EU opening towards CEECs on
the labour market by making use of a firm level postal survey that was sent out to 1580
Belgian firms in the Summer of 1996. Following a pilot study with a Belgian multinational
active in CEECs, we conducted a postal survey for which we selected companies at random
regardless of firm size or sector; 312 companies replied (i.e. 20%), 281 of which could be
used for our analysis. We subsequently merged our survey data with company accounts data
from the Central Bank of Belgium. We were able to match 262 companies, the remainder
being typically small companies employing no people.
We report the answers to a number of questions that are relevant for EU enlargement and
adjustment of the labour market. In the survey we inquired after the extent of changing
competitive pressure and its reasons. Table 5 shows the responses to the question whether
firms experienced an increase, no change or a decrease in domestic or foreign competition
(missing cases are excluded from the calculations).18
Table 5: Changes in competition
1986-1989 1990-1995
Increase no change decrease increase no change decrease
Domestic 39 % 55 % 6 % 54 % 37 % 9 %
Foreign 51 % 45 % 3 % 81 % 16 % 3 %
In table 6 the origin of the increased competition for the two periods is reported. We asked to
rank the most important regions where increased international competition came from.
Table 6: Source of foreign competition
Region (period 1986-89) Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 No Rank
Western Countries (*) 79 % 8 % 6 % 1 % 7 %
Central- and Eastern Europe 6 % 18 % 20 % 12 % 43 %
Southeast Asia 15 % 20 % 19 % 9 % 38 %
Others (**) 9 % 9 % 7 % 12 % 63 %
Region (period 1990-95) Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 No Rank
Western Countries (*) 66 % 11 % 9 % 2 % 12 %
Central- and Eastern Europe 17 % 26 % 15 % 11 % 31 %
Southeast Asia 20 % 19 % 18 % 9 % 33 %
Others (**) 9 % 7 % 9 % 14 % 61 %
(*) Western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia
(**) e.g. Latin-America, Turkey, Middle-East, Africa
It is interesting to note that the increase in foreign competition for both periods originated
especially from Western countries. Only 6% of the companies experienced as top rank an
increase of foreign competition from Central and Eastern Europe in the period 1986-89, while
this increased to 17% in the second period. This confirms some of the points raised before.
There has been an increase in foreign competition, yet one should not overemphasise the
impact of increased CEEC competition. While the region did become more important,19
growing competition from other Western countries is still the most important one for most
companies.
In table 7 we report the rankings of the reasons of this increased competition. The percentages
refer to 209 companies that experienced an increase in foreign competition during the period
1990-1995.
Table 7: Reasons for increased competition
Increase in foreign
competition due to…
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 No Rank
Technological
developments
16 % 12 % 18 % 16 % 1 % 37 %
Product innovation 16 % 14 % 19 % 13 % 1 % 37 %
Labour Costs 49 % 16 % 6 % 9 % 3 % 18 %
Globalisation 18 % 15 % 11 % 16 % 0 % 40 %
Other Reasons 21 % 6 % 4 % 2 % 2 % 66 %
Note: rank 1 is the most important, rank 5 is the least important. Columns do not sum to a
100% since the same rank to multiple options was allowed.
Almost half of the respondents consider the lower labour costs abroad to be the most
important factor contributing to the increase in foreign competition during the 1990-1995
period. It is well-known that, due to a number of institutional restrictions, labour costs in
Belgium are very high, the gross labour cost for an employer being on average twice the net
take home pay. Especially for companies operating in international sectors the regulatory
nature of the Belgian labour market seems to be a plausible explanation for the importance of
labour costs in table 7. This is also consistent with recent micro econometric evidence
estimating a long run labour elasticity of well above 1 in absolute value for Belgium (Konings
and Roodhooft, 1997). It seems to be the case that labour costs are important in explaining20
increased competition in international trade. In contrast, as we will show later, labour costs
do not seem to be the dominant factor for multinational firms to decide whether or not to
invest in the region.
In response of this increased international competition it is likely that companies took some
restructuring measures. Indeed, in our sample 52% of the companies did so. Table 8 gives an
overview of the most important actions that companies took. Modernising the production
process and reducing employment are some of the most frequent actions taken (respectively
32% and 29%). However, also 13% of the firms actually increased their labour force, so a
priori it is not clear which effect will dominate. It is striking that only 12% of the firms
moved their production facilities abroad in response of increased foreign competition. Thus
integration with CEECs has only a minor impact on transfer of EU production. Moreover,
employment adjustment did occur, but both in the negative and in the positive sense. The fact
that some firms expanded their workforce while others contracted it, could be related to the
type of workers in the firms, highly vs. lowly skilled. (At this stage, however, we do not have
further information available.
Table 8: The response of companies to increased competition
Action
Modernising the Production Process 32 %
Cutting the workforce 29 %
Outsourcing some part of the production process 16 %
Increasing the workforce 13 %
Moving abroad the production process 12 %
Retraining employees 12 %
Other measures taken 13 %
Only a small number of firms, 16 %, have its own production, service or sales facilities in
CEECs. Most of them are situated in the more advanced and politically stable countries of
Central Europe and in Russia. Of the 46 companies with production facilities in CEECs only
18 have transferred production lines from Belgium to CEECs and only 2 firms admitted that
this coincided with a decrease in the domestic workforce. When we asked for the reasons why
companies moved their activities to CEECs, the most important reasons they gave were21
labour costs and expansion plans, while general restructuring and social legislation were not
important.
Productivity
While labour costs seem to matter, it is important to relate them to productivity. Lower labour
costs reflect lower productivity. Indeed, as shown in table 9, 73% or 35 companies with
production facilities in CEECs, find that productivity is lower or much lower than it is in the
home country. 21 of them indicate cultural background and work ethics as the principal
cause. Aged technology and a less qualified workforce also play a role. Trade unions,
although politically important in many of the CEECs, do not seem to influence productivity in
an adverse way.
Table 9: Productivity of CEEC production facility compared to its Belgian counterpart
Relative Productivity in CEE Percentage




Much Higher 2 %
We finally asked a series of questions related to risk factors for investment in CEECs. We
asked to rank the five most important risk factors for investing in CEECs, out of a list of 12
possible risk factors, leaving the option of adding one more risk factor to the list. We asked
this question to the companies that invested in CEECs, as well as to those who did not invest
or plan to invest. The results are summarised in table 10.
Table 10: Risk factors for investing in CEE
Risk Factors. Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
Lack of clear legislation 25 % 12 % 9 %
Political instability 19 % 14 % 7 %
Uncertainty about the currency value 18 % 11 % 7 %
Insufficiently developed market economy 15 % 8 % 10 %
Difficulties in obtaining management control 13 % 7 % 10 %22
Insufficiently developed capital market 11 % 7 % 8 %
Deficient infrastructure 11 % 8 % 13 %
Lack of market information 9 % 6 % 5 %
Aged production technology 8 % 4 % 7 %
Other Risk Factors 8 % 2 % 1 %
Lack of protection of property rights 7 % 7 % 7 %
Uncertainty about price fluctuations 7 % 5 % 5 %
Lack of protection of intellectual rights 6 % 2 % 4 %
Table 10 shows that many companies still consider the CEEC market economies to be
underdeveloped, with a lack of clear legislation. Furthermore political instability and the
unstable currencies are important risk factors. This is consistent with the findings of Genco,
Taurelli and Viezolli (1993) covering 83 companies. They found that the main risk factors
relate to the weakness of the legislative framework, with the strictly economic problems only
coming second.
Job killers
We next want to investigate whether economic integration potentially kills jobs in the West.
We therefore estimate a labour demand function that we augment with indicators of increased
foreign competition. To focus our attention, the equation we seek to estimate is an augmented
labour demand function as follows,
it it it it ion globalizat w y n ε β α α α + + + + = ln ln ln 2 1 0 (1)
where y stands for output, n stands for employment, w for the wage cost of the firm, subscript
i and t stands for firm i at time t, globalization represents the controls for increased foreign
competition. We constructed three dummy variables, a dummy equal to 1 if there was an
increase in foreign competition originating from CEECs, fcco, a dummy equal to 1 if the
increase in foreign competition came from South East Asia, fczoa, and a dummy equal to 1 if
increased foreign competition came from other Western Countries, fcw. We also included a
proxy for market structure, measured by a dummy equal to 1, comp, if the manager responded
that his firm faced more than 5 competitors in its main product market. Finally ε  stands for23
the error term. Since we are using panel data it is possible to take into account firm
heterogeneity.  The error term in equation (1) is therefore assumed to satisfy the following
assumptions,


























Thus we model firm heterogeneity by an unobservable firm specific random effect, µ , and
equation (1) can be estimated using general least squares (Greene, 1990, pp.470-71).
Table 11 shows the results. First, in all specifications it can be seen that the labor demand
elasticity with respect to wages is high and statistically significant, as we would expect in a
labor demand equation.













































































































Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of
Observations
916 916 583 651
Global R2 0.7 0.7 0.62 0.68
Note: standard errors between brackets, * means statistical significant on the 5% reslevel.
In the first column it can be noted that the effect of increased foreign competition on the
demand for labor is positive, irrespective from where the increased competition has
originated. We also included a variable to control for technological innovations the firm had
undertaken. From the cross-tabulations it was clear that many firms responded to increased
foreign competition by modernizing their production process. We therefore included a
dummy equal to 1 if the firm introduced new technology (technology). The effect in column
(1) shows that technological innovations generate a positive effect on labor. In the second
column we tested whether small firms experience globalization differently than large firms.
This is not unreasonable since large firms typically have more market power and hence
increased foreign competition might erode this market power of the firms without causing
exit or layoffs. In contrast small firms often operate at the margin and so increased foreign
competition might force them out of the market. We had our indicators of globalization
interacted with the log output of the firm. A number of interesting results emerge. First, the
direct effect of foreign competition is negative and strongest for foreign competition from
CEECs. However, this negative effect disappears for larger firms, which can be seen from the
interaction terms (fccoXln(Q); fczoaXln(Q); fcwXln(Q)). We further tested whether
technological innovations were especially beneficial for firms with more highly skilled25
people. We therefore had technological innovations interacted with the percentage of workers
holding a university degree in the firm (university). It can be seen that the direct effect of
technological innovations disappears, but the interaction effect is positive and significant. In
other words, only firms with highly skilled labor benefit from technological innovations. At
the same time this result throws into doubt the commonly held argument that technological
progress is bad for lowly skilled people. We also tested whether the effect of foreign
competition was different in firms that introduced new technology. This was done by relating
the technology variable to the indicators of foreign competition. None of these interactions
were statistically significant. Finally, we tested in columns (3) and (4) whether foreign
competition affects lowly skilled people in a way different from the way it affects highly
skilled people. This is important because the unemployment problem in Europe refers
especially to the lowly skilled workers and the integration with CEECs could threaten
especially this category of workers. In the first two columns we did not make this distinction
and we just used as a dependent variable the log number of employees. We measure in
column (3) lowly skilled workers by the number of blue collar workers in the firm, highly
skilled workers are proxied by the number of white collar workers.
We find that only the effect of increased foreign competition that stems from CEECs has an
effect on the demand for blue and white collar workers. Moreover, the direct effect is
negative and almost twice as large with blue collar workers compared to white collar workers.
The effect vanishes however the larger the firm is. Nevertheless, this result suggests that the
effects of increased foreign competition are larger for lowly skilled workers than for highly
skilled. They are negative for workers in small firms, but positive for workers in big firms.
V. Conclusion
In section I we learned that the European Council, though accepting the principle of
enlargement, made CEEC accession dependent on their preliminary adoption of the Internal
Market law. The Europe Agreements were a missed opportunity to create strong trade links
with the CEECs because fear dominated EU strategy vis-à-vis the CEECs. Fear for a26
significant growth in imports,  fear for loss of jobs, fear for firms moving abroad , fear for the
financial burden, fear for pressure groups, fear for Member States protectionism, fear for not
being ready to welcome new Member States. This is the more amazing as we found out in
section II that although in the nineties imports from CEECs have increased, the EU has
become a net exporter to these countries and almost the entire CEEC imports and exports are
of EU origin. Therefore they are much more dependent on the EU than vice versa. Abolition
of antidumping and other trade restricting measures like rules of origin and mandatory
standards and specifications would positively influence trade. In case of unfair trade practices
the EU should extend its own competition and state aids legislation to CEECs.
In section III we learned that increased foreign competition for EU firms came predominantly
from other Western countries. High labor costs seemed to be an important factor explaining
increased foreign competition. Only in a limited number of cases EU firms moved their
production facilities abroad. We also found out that CEEC competition did kill EU lowly
skilled jobs but only in a limited number of (small) firms. Technological progress, which was
a typical response in firms subject to increased foreign competition, was of benefit to the
highly skilled workers only.
In order to appease current Member States and pressure groups arguing the need for
protectionism against so-called unfair CEEC competition, the EU has opted for a
conservative strategy. It tries to keep CEEC products out of its markets when they are thought
to injure Community industries and it does not want to accord CEEC workers free access to
its labour market. Based on the findings in this paper we firmly believe that a better strategy
for the future would be for the EU to brace itself for its enlargement with CEECs. This would
entail encouraging the modernization process, especially in its small enterprises and by
offering more educational opportunities to its lowly skilled workers. Rather than to protect its
large industries against what it calls unfair competition from CEECs. A better remedy would
be to strengthen the competitive basis in current Member States so as to enable them
sustaining the competition from CEECs in case of full free trade. There is no doubt that in the
short run EU consumers would benefit from this new approach while in the long run a deeper27
integration between the EU and the CEECs will turn out to be mutually beneficial for all the
social partners in both countries.28
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